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Abstract
Introduction: Risk communication can help reduce expo-
sures to environmental contaminants, mitigate negative 
health outcomes, and inform community-based decisions 
about hazardous waste sites. While communication best 
practices have long guided such efforts, little research has 
examined unintended consequences arising from such 
guidelines. As rhetoric informs stakeholder sensemaking, 
the language used in and reinforced by these guidelines 
can challenge relationships and exacerbate stakeholder 
tensions.
Objectives: This study evaluates risk communication at a 
U.S. Superfund site to identify unintended consequences 
arising from current risk communication practices.
Methods: This qualitative case study crystallizes data 
spanning 6 years from three sources: 1) local newspaper 
coverage of site-related topics; 2) focus-group transcripts 
from a multi-year project designed to support future vision-
ing of site use; and 3) published blog entries authored by a 
local environmental activist. Constant comparative analy-
sis provides the study’s analytic foundation, with quali-
tative data analysis software QSR NVivo 8  supporting a 
three-step process: 1) provisional coding to identify broad 
topic categories within datasets, 2) coding occurrences of 
sensemaking constructs and emergent intra-dataset pat-
terns, and 3) grouping related codes across datasets to 
examine the relationships among them.
Results: Existing risk communication practices at this 
Superfund site contribute to a dichotomous conceptual-
ization of multiple and diverse stakeholders as members of 
one of only two categories: the government or the public. 
This conceptualization minimizes perceptions of capacity, 
encourages public commitment to stances aligned with a 
preferred group, and contributes to negative expectations 
that can become self-fulfilling prophecies.
Conclusion: Findings indicate a need to re-examine and 
adapt risk communication guidelines to encourage more 
pluralistic understanding of the stakeholder landscape.
Keywords: environmental communication; hazardous 
waste sites; sensemaking; seven cardinal rules.
Introduction
In the mid-1980s, several high-profile environmental crises 
highlighted the need for government agencies and indus-
try to better inform citizens about exposure-related health 
risks (1–4). In response, the risk communication field 
emerged to develop strategies for sharing hazard-related 
information with lay populations. Among the field’s first 
products was the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(U.S. EPA) Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication 
(5), which provided recommendations later adapted and 
deployed by other agencies (6–8). While these guidelines 
improved on the sparse risk communication efforts that 
preceded them (9), their sustained use over time neces-
sitates examination of their long-term impacts on sense-
making (10), the interactive and situated way in which 
individuals jointly create shared meaning (11). An ongoing 
process, sensemaking helps people understand risk and 
shape their environments, which then constrains future 
choices and actions (12, 13).
This qualitative case study applies sensemak-
ing theory in a long-term risk communication setting 
to answer the research question, “How does long-term 
enactment of risk communication guidelines influence 
stakeholder understandings of roles, responsibilities, and 
actions in a complex policy context?” While constrained 
in scope and generalizability, such a context-driven case 
analysis can contribute important and transferable les-
sons-learned for similar settings while also beginning to 
address knowledge gaps regarding the real-world effects 
of guidelines and best practices over time. Focusing on 
discourse related to western Kentucky’s Paducah Gaseous 
Diffusion Plant (PGDP), a National Priorities List (NPL) 
Superfund site, this study examines multiple datasets to 
better understand how myriad communication activities 
across three decades have affected the three mediators 
that constrain sensemaking: 1) capacity, which restricts 
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the number and diversity of potential sensemakers; 2) 
commitment, which contributes to formation of “blind 
spots” in the “tenacious justification” of particular posi-
tions; and 3) expectations, which generate assumptions 
that become “self-fulfilling prophecies” (10). To explore 
these issues, however, first requires explication of the 
case context.
Superfund, Risk Communication, 
and the PGDP
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980, or Superfund, provided 
for long-term investigation and remediation of hazardous 
waste sites, creating a National Priorities List (NPL) to 
guide regulatory agencies (14). Within the decade, addi-
tional federal legislation strengthened state and local 
involvement in site-related planning and decisions (15). 
As the diversity of stakeholders guiding site decisions 
grew, so grew the need for timely, clear, and accurate risk 
communication. In 1988, Seven Cardinal Rules emerged to 
provide guidance in a variety of areas, urging practitioners 
to be credible and compassionate, develop partnerships, 
evaluate communications, and “listen to the public’s spe-
cific concerns” (5).
Statutory complexity and stakeholder diversity render 
Superfund communities particularly challenging environ-
ments for enacting these Rules, however. By federal law, 
the U.S. EPA oversees Superfund clean-up activities, while 
the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
(ATSDR) investigates site-related public health impacts 
(15). Additionally, the U.S. Department of Energy (U.S. 
DOE) is responsible for clean-up of 21 Superfund sites 
(16), with both the scale of its environmental management 
efforts and revelations of prior waste mismanagement (17) 
contributing to stakeholder distrust of the agency (18–20).
The PGDP exemplifies these challenges. A former U.S. 
DOE uranium enrichment facility, PGDP joined the NPL 
after the 1988 discovery of trichoroethylene and techne-
tium-99 in private drinking wells near the plant. Conse-
quently, the PGDP community – which comprises plant 
employees, residents nearby, and multiple public entities 
and private individuals with stakes in economic develop-
ment, environmental protection, and/or the health and 
well-being of the local populace – has received decades 
of risk information from federal, state, and local agencies, 
universities, and advocacy groups. Such information has 
focused on a wide range of topics, from informing com-
munity members about risk to helping former  employees 
and their families understand and navigate federal 
compensation processes to discussing the potential for 
federal acquisition of properties near the PGDP.
In Paducah, complex relationships have developed 
through decades of such discussions about the plant, its 
role(s) in the community, and the potential economic, 
health, and environmental consequences of its presence 
in the region. Thus, numerous constituencies with varied 
levels of technical knowledge and emotional investment 
have shared information with each other. From this infor-
mation and guided by prior events and understandings, 
stakeholders attempt to understand site-related risks. 
Despite years of information flows, many local stakehold-
ers have expressed distrust of such information, citing 
government agencies and the U.S. DOE in particular as 
untrustworthy (21). Such ongoing credibility concerns 
raise questions about how more than a quarter-century of 
risk communication activities have informed stakeholder 
relationships and sensemaking.
Methods
This study crystallizes data from three sources spanning 6  years 
(2005–2011) that together present diverse perspectives about the 
plant. First, local newspaper coverage of PGDP-related topics was 
analyzed for calendar year 2005, a period during which public infor-
mation exchanges were necessitated by such high-profile events as: 
1) transfer of sick worker health benefits administration from the U.S. 
DOE to the US Department of Labor; 2) public release of a federal 
report on employee radiation exposure at the plant; 3) negotiation 
of new environmental cleanup subcontracts; and 4) Department of 
Homeland Security drills. Analysis of the 364 daily archived editions 
available yielded 85 PGDP-related articles.
Secondly, focus group transcripts were analyzed from a 2010–
2011 project designed to help identify stakeholder values and prefer-
ences related to the final disposition of the PGDP site following the 
plant’s anticipated closure. Eight focus group sessions deployed pur-
posive sampling to convene individuals with similar commitments 
and perspectives: 1) PGDP employees; 2) U.S. DOE employees and 
subcontractors; 3) residents near the plant who receive municipal 
water at U.S. DOE expense; 4) civic leaders from an adjacent county; 
5) environmental and health advocates; 6) economic development 
and local government leaders; 7) hunting, wildlife, recreation, and 
tourism enthusiasts; and 8) healthcare professionals and educators. 
Among the 64 adults who participated in one of these focus groups, 
44 were male and 20 female.
The third data source consisted of public blog entries written 
by a local environmental activist who had been dissatisfied with his 
participation in one of the focus groups, as well as with the over-
all project. Using his blog as a forum, he wrote extensively about his 
perception of the events that transpired during the focus group and 
in the months that followed. A total of nine blogs were analyzed, pro-
viding key information regarding how this participant made sense of 
the research team, the project, and the focus group itself through the 
lens of past interactions with other site stakeholders.
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Qualitative data analysis software QSR NVivo 8 supported tex-
tual analysis (22, 23) through a three-step process. This process began 
with provisional coding of each dataset independently to identify 
broad topic categories, followed by coding occurrences of sensemak-
ing constructs and emergent intra-dataset patterns before grouping 
related codes across datasets to examine the relationships among 
them (24). Constant comparative methods (25, 26) provided the ana-
lytic foundation, with cycles of data coding that involved repeated 
comparison of data to extant literature to initial conclusions and 
back to data (27–29).
Limitations
Case study research focuses on understanding rather than prediction 
and is bounded by geographic, temporal, and sociopolitical dimen-
sions. While findings are not generalizable, insights may be trans-
ferrable to similar settings and circumstances (30, 31). The inclusion 
of multiple datasets, extensive participant-observer field notes, 
and member checks of preliminary results are intended to support 
informed assessments of validity and transferability to similar set-
tings and situations (26).
Results
Discourse about the PGDP often relies on dichotomous 
terminology dividing stakeholders into two camps: 1) 
The Government and 2) The Public. These groupings con-
flate roles and responsibilities among site-related actors, 
downplaying the variety of perspectives about and stakes 
in the site. This division appears across news coverage, 
focus groups, and local blogs.
Newspaper content analysis of 85 articles identified 21 
instances of the conflation of multiple agencies into The 
Government, often related to coverage of a worker com-
pensation program that had changed management. In one 
article, a journalist responded to suspicions that employee 
illnesses were exposure-related with, “Now the govern-
ment confirms it” (32). With the U.S. DOE, the National 
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, and the U.S. 
Department of Labor playing distinct roles in various 
aspects of the transition, the journalist’s assertion about 
“the government” presented a tidy but oversimplified 
depiction of the situation. A subsequent article included 
a deceased worker’s family member stating that “the gov-
ernment is trying to get out of paying what it owes” (33), 
implying that all agencies were working toward a clearly 
defined, shared goal of disadvantaging sick workers.
Such framing also was problematic when distrust 
of the U.S. DOE extended to distrust of all governmental 
entities. When stakeholders in focus groups were asked 
to name credible sources for PGDP-related information, 
many stated flatly that the U.S. DOE was not credible. Use 
of “The Government” expanded that distrust to encom-
pass other agencies. As one participant noted, “I would 
not want [information from] anybody affiliated with the 
government in any way”.
While many local stakeholders saw a credibility 
deficit for The Government, focus groups with techni-
cal experts saw agency staff and plant employees often 
using the term “The Public” to describe those stakehold-
ers perceived as having a technical knowledge deficit. One 
worker reminded researchers that they were not talking to 
the public [because] “the general public still has a very 
vague idea of what’s out here”. Explaining that the errone-
ous “general consensus” was that site contamination was 
on par with a nuclear power plant, he noted, “No matter 
what scenario you go with, that’s going to “be a factor with 
the general public”. Thus, the employee not only sepa-
rated himself and his colleagues from The Public, but he 
also implicitly defined The Public as a group that clings to 
misinformation in the face of technical facts. Such state-
ments indicate a blind spot the employee had regarding 
the (in)ability of The Public to understand and interpret 
relevant risk information.
In contrast, stakeholders who self-identified as The 
Public saw themselves as targets of manipulation by The 
Government. In evaluating one hypothetical scenario for 
the site’s future, a focus group participant stated that 
it seemed like “one of the easier ones “for the public to 
swallow”, while a local business leader remarked that 
another scenario would be “a tough sell for the public”. 
Thus, while The Public is depicted as playing a passive 
role, it also is seen as vulnerable to persuasion under 
certain circumstances.
For one local blogger, the ability to define member-
ship in The Public was important. Reporting that he had 
requested a list of study “advisory board” members, 
he noted that he was certain it consisted of “a bunch of 
names of ‘influential’ folks”, further stating that, “it’s 
important for the public to know” the membership roster 
(34). These statements support a vision of “influential” 
members of the community – often the gatekeepers with 
whom risk communicators partner – as outside, rather 
than members of, The Public.
Discussion
In Paducah, plant-related discourse surrounding The 
Government and The Public creates a rhetorical binary 
(35, 36) that implies only two possible identities exist, 
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thus reducing sensemaking capacity and limiting the per-
ceived range of choices and perspectives. This constraint 
complicates information exchange, as individuals catego-
rize messages, activities, perspectives, and motives within 
one of the two categories reflected in the Seven Cardinal 
Rules approach: an agency helping a public fill informa-
tion gaps. At long-term risk sites, however, multiple organ-
izations address diverse stakeholders through statements, 
press releases, and public meetings, often over a period of 
decades. When all agencies are included in the monolithic 
The Government, the perceived number of actors is greatly 
reduced, roles and responsibilities become muddied, and 
expectations based on one agency’s prior actions drive 
assumptions about another’s current actions. Thus, 
stakeholders who view all members of The Government as 
representing a lone, distinct perspective may expect little 
benefit from engaging multiple agencies.
The second term in the binary, The Public, is codified 
in Seven Cardinal Rules, with the phrase appearing nine 
times in the two-page document. When diverse organiza-
tions and individuals are grouped as the monolithic The 
Public, sensemaking capacity again is challenged by a 
reduction in the perceived number of distinct actors and 
sometimes conflicting viewpoints. Thus, agency officials 
and others who view The Public as representing a lone, 
distinct perspective may expect little benefit from engag-
ing these diverse groups and individuals.
In addition to decreasing capacity, the binary promotes 
adversarial relationships by underscoring differences and 
marginalizing stakeholders. Through the othering process 
(37), in which people classify some individuals or groups 
as being entirely different from themselves, stakeholders 
commit to one of two available identities and judge the 
other’s merit based on its opposition to self. Paducah pro-
vides numerous examples of othering, with The Govern-
ment frequently described as slow, bureaucratic, and/or 
secretive, while The Public is depicted as lacking techni-
cal knowledge, the ability to adequately apply technical 
information to decision-making, and/or a level of control 
that would permit real influence on governmental deci-
sions. Commitment to one of these identities thus contrib-
utes to blind spots about the motivations, statements, and 
actions of other stakeholders, as well as to tenacious justi-
fications of one’s own beliefs and opinions.
Conclusion
By implementing sensemaking theory as a diagnostic 
tool, this study identifies communication challenges in 
one chronic risk community. For decades, the U.S. EPA’s 
Seven Cardinal Rules and other best practices have played 
important roles in how site stakeholders discuss and 
understand risk. While related evaluations often focus 
on assessing knowledge and/or attitude change, it also is 
important to examine the effects of risk communication 
on site relationships.
To address the communicative and relational chal-
lenges described, a reconceptualization of risk com-
munication is needed that transitions from guidelines 
focused on The Public and The Government to acknowl-
edge explicitly the diversity of stakeholders involved 
in site-related decisions, thereby increasing capacity, 
reducing the likelihood of intransigent commitments, 
and improving expectations for communication and 
collaboration. Subsequent revised risk communication 
guidelines could promote shared sensemaking while 
mitigating adversarial interactions that contribute to the 
formation of blind spots. Over time, such changes could 
improve capacity for sensemaking across constituencies, 
creating a more positive framework within which diverse 
stakeholders can collaborate to mutually assess risk and 
make decisions.
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